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                                                         Abstract
1This paper investigates how the thinness of foreign-exchange markets causes
destabilizing speculations, especially when exchange-rate flexibility is increased as in the
Asian crisis countries.  In what follows, we analyze the impact of this foreign-exchange
market thinness on the dynamic capital mobility and capital-market risk of four Asian crisis
countries: Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand.  Using the vector-autoregression
model, impulse response functions, and variance decomposition, it is shown that in
response to one-standard-deviation shock to interest and exchange rates, the dynamic
capital mobility of all four crisis countries has decreased in the short run.  These shocks
also cause the capital-market risk of these countries to increase.
 Since the onset of the crisis, the Asian crisis countries responded by increasing their
interest rates and devaluing their currencies. These measures are intended to stem capital
flight from the borrowing countries and to encourage capital inflows. However, in an
environment of protracted financial-sector reform and thin foreign-exchange markets,
these standard policies did not stabilize the capital inflows into these crisis countries.  Our
research supports the view that because the standard policies were not able to change
institutional investors’ (self-fulfilling) expectations and their herding behavior, the Asian
crisis countries’ policies have -- in the short run -- not been successful. This failure is in
large part attributable to the very thin foreign-exchange markets of these Asian countries.
I. Introduction
2    Since Asia’s financial crisis began in 1997 most research has focused on the speculative
attacks perpetuated by hedge funds and their impact on the crisis countries’ economies
(see, e.g., Kray, 1998 and Goldfajn, 1998).  However, little effort has been made to
examine the role of the microstructure of the foreign-exchange market in the propagation
of the crisis and how this microstructure affected capital inflows and capital- market risks.
Indeed, only a few studies have focused on the thinness of foreign-exchange markets and
its impact on exchange-rate dynamics (Lyons, 1996; Goodhart and Payne, 1996; and
Alberto and Francesco, 1985).  Since the crisis, borrowing countries adopted exchange-
rate flexibility and tightened their monetary policy so that balance-of-payments pressures
are reduced.  These policy prescriptions are meant to stabilize capital flows in crisis
countries because in theory, they provide a strong incentive for foreign investors to keep
their money where it is.  However, if these policy prescriptions do not change the (self-
fulfilling) destabilizing foreign investors’ herding behavior, they may not stabilize capital
flows in the crisis countries (see, e.g., Avery and Zemsky, 1998; Grinblatt, Titman, and
Wermers, 1995; Redding, 1996; and Teh and de Bondt, 1997).
Although the situation in these countries is still unfolding and new disturbances can
not be ruled out, it is still worthwhile to investigate these countries’ experiences to date.
Our primary goal is to investigate the short-run impact of the crisis countries’ policy
responses on their dynamic capital mobility and capital-market risk.  Table 1 indicates the
thinness of the foreign-exchange markets of these four Asian crisis countries relative to
Mexico and advanced economies.  It is reasonable to assume that this extreme degree of
foreign-exchange market thinness was an important factor that not only contributed to the
crisis but is also constraining the ongoing adjustment to the crisis.
3 Of the many debates that have intensified since the onset of the Asian crisis, the one
devoted to the advisability of capital controls is especially important.  As The Economist
(1998a) recently put it, did Asia’s ex-tiger economies collapse because they were too open
to international finance or because they weren’t open enough?1  Many prominent
economists, including Paul Krugman (1998), James Tobin, and Barry Eichengreen (see
IMF, 1998c) have advocated that developing countries should institute some sort of
capital control or regulation so as to avoid future crises on the scale of the current crisis.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the various types of capital controls that
have been proposed (to deal with future capital inflows and to minimize current capital
outflows) and whether or not capital controls are effective (or dangerous).2  However,
before joining this capital-control debate and deciding, for example, that an explicit policy,
like the “Tobin tax” is needed to limit short-term speculative inflows, a greater
understanding of the current implicit or effective degree of capital mobility between
countries is necessary.  Although explicit capital controls may not exist, capital flows
between countries very much depend on factors like transaction costs and risk premia,
which therefore implicitly affect the degree of capital mobility.
In what follows, we define capital mobility for a given country as the deviation
from uncovered interest parity.  It is important to measure the effective capital mobility
situation that each crisis country faces and to understand how this capital mobility is (and
                                               
1 This “second kind of openness” refers to Asia’s financial system being protected from outside
competition.
2 See The Economist (1998b) for some of the practical difficulties and dangerous side effects of capital
controls. See Krugman (1998) for his suggestions as to effective ways to control capital flight.  See
the IMF (1998c) for a good discussion of many capital mobility issues, including the IMF’s role in
the capital-account liberalization process.
4has been) affected by various macroeconomic policies before deciding whether or not new
explicit capital controls would be advisable.  As an example of how our measure of capital
mobility is affected by macroeconomic policy, we examine how our measure has changed
due to recent policies, such as increased flexibility in exchange rates.3  According to our
measure, capital mobility has recently been significantly affected.  So, deciding on
appropriate explicit capital controls without first looking at how capital mobility has
already changed may well lead to inappropriate policy measures.
In section II, we present our definition of capital mobility, capital-market risk, and
a vector-autoregression model that is used to analyze the short-run impact of interest-rate
increases and devaluation. In section III, we investigate the impact of interest- and
exchange-rate changes on the capital mobility of crisis countries. In section IV, we
examine the short-run impact of these shocks on the countries’ capital-market risk.
Section V presents our conclusions.
II. The Model
1. The Definition of Dynamic Capital Mobility
The definition of dynamic capital mobility is based on the uncovered interest parity
(UIP) and ex ante PPP conditions as modeled by Bhati and Moosa (1994, 1995, and 1997)
and Moosa (1997).  If there is perfect capital mobility with no capital controls, transaction
                                               
   3.  It should be pointed out that the crisis would have been much greater had the Fund not intervened
and provided much-needed liquidity.  See Fischer (1998) for a discussion of some of the lessons that
have been learned from this crisis.
5costs or risk premia, the expected rate of change of the spot exchange rate will be equal to
the nominal interest-rate differential on perfectly comparable  financial assets denominated in
different currencies across countries.   This condition is given by
(1)         (1 + I t) =  (1 + D Se t ) (1 + I* t ),
where D Se t is the expected rate of change of the spot exchange rate, and I and I* are the
nominal interest rates in the home and foreign countries respectively.  An alternative
specification is derived by solving equation (1) for the expected spot exchange rate, Se, to
obtain
(2)   Se =  F*  ,
where  F* = S[(1+I)/(1+I*)] is the interest parity forward rate which is equal to the forward
exchange rate, F, if and only if the CIP holds.
Taking logarithms in equation (2), we obtain equation (3):
(3)  se t+1  =  f*t ,
where se t+1  is  the logarithm of the expected spot rate and f*t is the logarithm of the
interest-parity forward rate.  Allowing for the existence of a risk premium and assuming that
expectations are rational, equation (3) can be written in a testable form as:
(4)   s t+1  =  b 0 +  b 1 f*t   + w t+1
 where w t+1  is an error term reflecting the impact of news and b 0 is a constant term
reflecting the value of the risk premium as well as other factors such as transaction costs.
The UIP holds in strong form if b 0 =0 and  b 1=1 are not rejected.   Assuming that these
conditions hold, equation (4) becomes
6(5)  s t+1  =  f*t   + w t+1 .
However, when capital is not perfectly mobile because of capital and foreign-exchange
controls (as is the case in the Pacific Asian developing countries), UIP will not hold.   The
deviation from UIP (DUIP) can be written as:
               (6)    DUIP t = s t+1  - f*t   + x t+1
where DUIPt4  is  the deviation from UIP, which will vary over time.  We will use DUIP as
a measure of dynamic capital mobility.   The larger is the deviation from UIP, the greater
are capital or foreign-exchange controls in that country, and the lower is capital mobility.
2. The Definition of Capital-Market Risk
      This section specifies a model of time-varying systematic risk as deviations from
uncovered interest parity in the international capital market.  Following Bollerslev (1986),
a particular parameterization of the multivariate GARCH process is employed to model
the conditional variance of covariance matrix of unforecastable components of deviations
from UIP.  The empirical results indicate substantial conditional systemic risk for all Asian
countries. This time-varying risk can be explained by both fluctuations in interest-rate
differentials and interest-parity forward rates.
  Next, we turn to the model determining the conditional second moments of
innovations to UIP.  A considerable amount of empirical evidence suggests that deviations
                                               
4 The equation for DUIP, equation 6, also includes an expectational error for the future spot rate.  We are
indebted to A. Kraay for this point.
7from UIP are characterized by ARCH effects (see, e.g., Cumby, 1987; Domowitz and
Hakkio, 1985; Enders, 1995; Hamilton, 1994).  Since we did not specify a full equilibrium
model of the economy, it is impossible to relate the conditional covariance matrix of those
innovations to a set of structural variables.  Thus, the linear GARCH model is a good
candidate for modeling the time-dependence of conditional second moments.  In order to
ensure positive definiteness, the parameterization of the multivariate GARCH model
proposed by Bollerslev (1990) and Bailie and Bollerslev (1990) is adopted.    Using
equation (6) for DUIP, GARCH (1,1) can be specified in the following way:
(6)     DUIP t = s t+1  - f*t   + x t+1
           (7)      x t ~ N (0, ht )
            (8)      ht   =   f1 +  f 2 e2 t-1   +  h t-1
 where ht is the conditional second moment.
3. The Vector-Autoregression Model
A three-variable vector-autoregression (VAR) model is used to investigate the
dynamic impact of interest- and exchange-rate shocks on capital-market risk and capital
mobility in the crisis countries.  Consider a vector of stationary variables X and a vector of
structural shocks e.   The structural model can be written as equation (9),
(9)      Xt = C (L) et
where C is a non-singular matrix of coefficients and L denotes the lag operator.  A
reduced form of the structural system that can be estimated is given by
8(10) G(L) DXt = F  Xt-1 e*t.
Assuming that the long-run moving average coefficient matrix C (1) is lower triangular
and that the elements of e t are mutually uncorrelated, one can follow Ahmed et al. (1993)
to retrieve the structural coefficient from the reduced form.  Let the vector of stationary
variables be X1 = {dr, ex, duip } and X2 = {dr, ex, var } and the vector of shocks be
e1 = {edr, eex, eduip} and e2 = {edr, eex, evar}, where dr denotes the discount-rate interest
differential, ex is the nominal exchange rate, duip is the deviation from uncovered interest
parity, and var is the capital-market risk measured by conditional heteroscedasticity.
Structural shocks are permanent disturbances to the interest-rate differential, nominal
exchange rate, and deviations from uncovered interest rate parity.   The way in which the
variables are assumed to be related in the long run (i.e., ignoring the lagged dynamic terms
in the VAR) can be written as:
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where dr*, ex*, and duip* are constant and independent of the structural shocks.
Identifying assumptions for the structural model are given by the triangular matrix of C(1).
A general justification for triangularity of the model is as follows.   First, the assumption
that the long-run interest differential is exogenous implies the zero-restrictions for c12 and
c13.  Using the discount rate as the interest-rate variable justifies treating interest rates as
exogenous. Second, the assumption that the deviation from uncovered interest parity can
9not affect the exchange rate implies that c23 is zero.  Hence, the assumptions that C(1) is
lower triangular and that the shocks are orthogonal enables us to identify the fundamental
disturbances.  Note that the method of identification imposes no restrictions on the short-
run movements of the variables, which instead are determined by the data.
III.  Estimation of the Impact of Interest- and Exchange- Rate Shocks on the Capital
Mobility
In this section, we investigate the impact of interest- and exchange-rate shocks on
the dynamic capital mobility of the four crisis countries.  The optimal lag structure is
derived using the likelihood-ratio test for each of the Asian crisis countries.
1. Data
 The experiences of four Asian countries are examined: Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and
Thailand.  For these countries, dynamic capital mobility has been estimated with reference
to Japan using the London inter-bank offer rate (LIBOR) on three-month Japanese
deposits (IFS line 60ea).  For the four Asian countries, market interest rates are used (IFS
line 60b).  To get predetermined interest rates for the crisis countries, we use each
country's end-of-period discount rate (IFS line 60).  To get the nominal Japanese yen
exchange rate for each of these four countries' currencies, the U.S. dollar exchange rate
(IFS line ae) is converted using the U.S. dollar exchange rate of the Japanese yen.
10
Considering the large liberalization process and possible consequent structural changes in
financial structure in each country during the 1980s, monthly data from January 1990 to
March 1998 are used in the estimation.   All data were extracted from the August 1998
CD-Rom version of the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (1998b).  The values of
dynamic capital mobility, DUIP, estimated for each of the four Asian crisis countries are
presented in Figure 1.5  A chronology that shows how these countries changed their
exchange-rate flexibility in an attempt to deal with the growing crisis is found in Table 2.
2. Estimation
A. Indonesia
The optimal lag length for Indonesia according to the likelihood-ratio test is 6
periods.  While a lag length of 6 is not a restriction on lag length 7, a lag length of 5 is
binding on lag length 6, i.e., probability [Chi-squared (lag 7 vs lag 6)=9.66] is 0.37,
whereas the probability [Chi-squared (lag 6 vs lag 5)=19.06] is 0.00.  The ordering of
variables in the VAR model is based on the block causality test reported in the note at the
bottom of  Table 3.  The block causality tests indicate that the direction of causality is
from interest rates to exchange rates.  Exchange-rate changes affect interest rates and the
degree of capital mobility.  Additionally, capital mobility causes interest rate and exchange
rate.  So, the ordering of interest rate, exchange rate, and capital mobility (DUIP) is used.
Different orderings were tried, but the results did not change substantially.
Figure 3-1 shows the impulse response function of dynamic capital mobility in
Indonesia with one-standard-deviation shocks of foreign exchange and interest (i.e.,
                                               
5 See Min (1998) for the identification and detailed estimation process.
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discount) rates.  This figure shows that both shocks increase the deviation from uncovered
interest parity, i.e., dynamic capital mobility decreases.  Also, a one-standard-deviation
shock to the interest-rate differential decreases the dynamic capital mobility of Indonesia
in the short run.
The variance decomposition of Indonesia's capital mobility reported in Table 3. In
the short run (up to six months), exchange-rate effects dominate; consequently, the
combined effect of both shocks has been to decrease Indonesia's dynamic capital mobility
since January 1998.  Figure 1 confirms these results.
 B. Korea
 An optimal lag length of two periods is chosen for the estimation.  This is because a lag
length of 2 is not a restriction on lag length 3, but a lag length of 1 is binding on a lag
length of 2, i.e., the probability  [Chi-squared (lag 3 vs lag 2)=7.3] is 0.605 and the
probability [Chi-squared (lag 2 vs lag 1)=13.8] is 0.00.  The ordering of variables in the
VAR model is based on the block exogeneity test reported in the note at the bottom of
Table 4.  Block causality tests indicate that the interest causes itself, the exchange rate
causes capital mobility and itself, and capital mobility causes only itself.  So, the
appropriate ordering is to have the exchange rate followed by the interest rate and then
capital mobility (DUIP). Different orderings were tried, but the results were not
substantially different.
  Figure 4-1 shows Korea’s impulse response functions.  An exchange-rate shock of one
standard deviation decreases capital mobility in the short run (up to 9 months).  Also, an
interest-rate differential shock of one standard error deviation decreases dynamic capital
12
mobility in both the short and medium runs (up to 14 months).  Figure 1 indicates that
capital mobility has decreased (or the deviation from UIP has increased) in Korea.  After
the Korean exchange rate was allowed to float and interest rates were increased, foreign
investment into Korea decreased significantly in the short run.  In January 1998, foreign
investment into Korea decreased by 85.1 percent compared to January 1997 and in
February 1998 it decreased by 45.2 percent compared to February 1997.  This trend lasted
for four months in Korea.6
 Table 4 shows the variance decomposition of Korea’s dynamic capital. The forecast
error variance of Korea’s capital mobility is mostly explained by the change in exchange
rates -- the role of the interest-rate differential is minor.  A policy implication of this
finding is that Korea's high interest-rate/tight monetary policy did not prevent foreign
capital from leaving.  Nor did the free floatation of Korea’s exchange rate contribute to
the inflow of foreign capital.  Figure 1 confirms this finding: since December 1997 the
deviation from UIP has been increasing, which means that dynamic capital mobility has
been decreasing.
C. Malaysia
An optimal lag length of seven periods is chosen based on the likelihood-ratio test.
This is because a lag length of 7 is not a restriction on lag length 8, but a lag length of 6 is
binding on a lag length of 7, i.e., the probability [Chi-squared (lag 8 vs lag 7)=14.53] is
                                               
6       The monthly trend of foreign investments in Korea during 1998 is given below in millions of U.S.
dollars.  The figures in parentheses denote the percentage rate of decrease compared to 1997
(Ministry of Finance and Economy, 1998).
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0.104 and the probability [Chi-squared (lag 7 vs lag 6)=19.06] is 0.024.  The ordering of
variables in the VAR model is based on the block causality test reported in the note of
Table 5.  Block causality tests indicate that the interest rate causes the exchange rate and
itself, the exchange rate causes the interest rate, and capital mobility causes the interest
rate and itself.  So, the ordering of capital mobility, interest rate and then exchange rate is
used.  Various other orderings were tried, but trends were comparable to those presented
below.
Malaysia’s impulse response function is shown in Figure 5-1.  A one-standard-
deviation shock to the exchange rate causes the deviation from UIP to increase (or capital
mobility to decrease) in the short run (up to 6 months).  However, a one-standard-
deviation shock to the interest-rate differential causes the deviation from UIP to decrease
(or capital mobility to increase).
Table 5 shows the variance decomposition for Malaysia.  Because the impact of
the interest-differential differential is larger than that of the exchange-rate shock, the
combined impact has been an increase in Malaysia's capital mobility since August 1997.
Figure 1 confirms this finding.
D. Thailand
An optimal lag length of five is chosen for the estimation. This is because a lag
length of 5 is not a restriction on lag length 6, but a lag length of 4 is binding on a lag
length of 5, i.e., the probability [Chi-squared (lag 6 vs lag 5)=12.28] is 0.1975 and the
                                                                                                                                           
        January $130 (-85.1 percent); February $199 (-45.2 percent); March $243 (-72.6 percent); and April
$567 (-63.8 percent).
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probability [Chi-squared (lag 5 vs lag 4)=23.46] is 0.005.  The ordering of variables in the
VAR model is based on the block causality test reported in the note of Table 6.  Block
causality tests show that the exchange rate causes the interest rate, capital mobility, and
itself; the interest rate causes itself; and capital mobility (DUIP) causes the exchange rate,
the interest rate, and itself.  So, the ordering of exchange rate, capital mobility, and
interest rate is used. Various other orderings were tried, but the results were not
significantly different.
 Figure 6-1 shows the impulse response function of Thailand for a one-standard-deviation
shock of the foreign exchange rate on dynamic capital mobility measured by the deviation
from uncovered interest parity.  The exchange-rate shock decreases the dynamic capital
mobility of Thailand in the short run (up to 3 months).  The interest-rate differential has a
very similar impact on Thailand’s capital mobility.
Table 6 shows the variance decomposition of capital mobility and capital-market
risk in Thailand.  Because the exchange-rate effect has a dominating impact on the
forecast error variance of the dynamic capital mobility, the combined effect from both the
exchange-rate and interest-rate shocks was a decrease in Thailand’s dynamic capital
mobility.  In fact, in the first four months of 1998 net capital outflows totaled U.S. $1.4
billion (Bangkok Bank, 1998).
IV. The Short-Run Impact of Interest- and Exchange-Rate Shocks on Capital-
Market Risk
In this section, we use the definition of capital-market risk used in Min (1998) and
we connect the concept of dynamic capital mobility with capital-market risk as measured
by conditional heteroscedasticity.  Conditional heteroscedasticity has been used as a
15
measurement of risk in various studies (see, e.g., Domowitz and Hakkio, 1985; Hassapis,
1995; and Malliaropulos, 1997).   Both country and currency risk are often defined
relative to an international reference country or currency, with the differential country risk
of the others allowed to include actuarial compensation for losses expected from political
instability, payments delays, and partial expropriation or default  (see Furstenberg, 1998).
The estimated capital-market risk for each of the four Asian crisis countries is presented in
Figure 2.7
A. Indonesia
An optimal lag length of four periods is used for estimation.  This is because a lag
length of 4 is not a restriction on lag length 5, but a lag length of 3 is binding on a lag
length of 4, i.e., probability [Chi-squared (lag 5 vs lag 4)=9.65] is 0.205 and the
probability [Chi-squared (lag 5 vs lag 4)=143.8] is 0.000.    The ordering of variables in
the VAR model is based on the block causality test reported in the note at the bottom of
Table 3. Block causality tests show that the interest rates causes the exchange rate and
itself; the exchange rate causes the interest rate, capital-market risk, and itself; and capital-
market risk causes the interest rate, the exchange rate, and itself.  So. the ordering of the
interest rate, exchange rate, and capital- market risk is employed. Various other orderings
were tried out, but the results were not substantially different.
Figure 3-2 shows the impulse response function for Indonesia. A one-standard-
deviation shock of the exchange rate (devaluation) increases capital-market risk measured
by the conditional heteroscedasticity.  We can see that a one-standard-deviation shock of
the exchange rate increases capital-market risk in the short run (one to six months) by a
                                               
7 See Min (1998) for the details.
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small margin, whereas the exchange-rate impact is quite large in the long run (up to 24
months.  If we look at the one-standard-deviation shock of the interest rate to capital-
market risk, we can see that the response of capital-market risk (i.e., capital outflow) is
increasing continuously throughout the period with little volatility in the short run.
Consequently, an interest-rate shock destabilizes the capital market.  From Figure 2 we
can see that capital-market risk has increased two-fold after exchange rates became more
flexible and interest rates increased.
 Table 3 shows the forecast error variance decomposition of capital-market risk.   It is
clear that exchange rates are playing the dominant role for the fluctuation of capital-
market risk throughout the period of study.  The policy implication of this finding is that,
during the crisis the foreign-exchange market was in fundamental disequilibrium and the
sudden floatation of exchange rates (see Table 2) increased the uncertainty in Indonesia’s
foreign-exchange market.  The exchange-rate shock, from two months on, explains more
than 80 percent of the forecast error variance of the capital-market risk.  This accelerated
the destabilizing impact of exchange-rate floatation in Indonesia.  Figure 2 confirms this
sharp increase in capital-market risk in Indonesia.
B. Korea
An optimal lag length of three periods is used for the estimation.  Because a lag
length of 3 is not a restriction on lag length 4, whereas a lag length of 2 is binding on a lag
length of 3, i.e., the probability [Chi-squared (lag 4 vs lag 3)=15.41] is 0.08 and the
probability [Chi-squared (lag 3 vs lag 2)=22.87] is 0.006.  The ordering of variables in the
VAR model is based on the block causality test reported in the note at the bottom of Table
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4.  Block causality tests show that the interest rate causes the exchange rate and itself; the
exchange rate causes capital-market risk and itself; and capital-market risk causes the
exchange rate and itself.  So, the appropriate ordering is to have the interest rate followed
by the exchange rate and capital-market risk. Different orderings were also tried, but the
results were very similar.
The impulse response of capital-market risk is shown in Figure 4-2.  We can see
that an exchange-rate shock has a positive impact on Korea's capital-market risk and its
impact increases as time passes.  An interest-rate shock has a similar effect on Korea’s
capital market; however, its six-month impact is contained within a one-standard deviation
band.
Table 4 shows the variance decomposition for Korea.  In the short and long runs
an exchange-rate shock has about a 55 percent greater impact than an interest-rate shock
on Korea’s capital-market risk.  This is shown in Figure 2.
C. Malaysia
An optimal lag length of seven periods is used for estimation.  Since a lag length of
7 is not a restriction on lag length 8, but a lag length of 6 is binding on a lag length of 7,
i.e., the probability [Chi-squared (lag 8 vs lag 7) =13.86] is 0.12 and the probability [Chi-
squared (lag 7 vs lag 6)=24.14]= 0.004.  The ordering of variables in the VAR model is
based on the block causality test reported in the note of Table 5. Block causality tests
show that the exchange rate causes the interest rate and itself; the interest rate causes
itself; and capital- market risk causes the interest rate and itself.  So, the ordering of
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capital-market risk, interest rate, and exchange rate is used.  Different orderings were also
used, but the results did not change substantially.
 Figure 5-2 shows the impulse response function of Malaysia with a one-standard-
deviation shock of the interest and exchange rates on capital-market risk. An exchange-
rate shock increases the capital-market risk in the short run (up to 6 months). The interest-
rate shock also increases the capital-market risk.  Both shocks contributed to the increase
of capital-market risk in the short run.  Figure 2 confirms that Malaysia's capital-market
risk increased over the period under study.
 Table 5 shows the variance decomposition of Malaysia’s capital-market risk. The
exchange rate has a dominating impact on capital-market risk up to eight months,
thereafter the interest-rate shock dominates.  Since both shocks affect the capital-market
risk in the same way, capital-market risk increases in the short run as indicated in Figure 2.
 D. Thailand
An optimal lag length of one is used for estimation.  Since a lag length of 1 is not a
restriction on lag length 2, but a lag length of 0 is binding on a lag length of 1, i.e., the
probability [Chi-squared (lag 2 vs lag 1)=15.7] is 0.073 and the probability [Chi-squared
(lag 1 vs lag 0)=1460.6] is 0.000.   The ordering of variables in the VAR model is based
on the block causality test reported in the note at the bottom of Table 6.  Block causality
tests show that the interest rate causes itself; the exchange rate causes itself; whereas
capital-market risk causes the interest rate and itself.  So, the ordering of capital-market
risk, interest rate, and exchange rate is used. Different orderings were tried out, but the
results were very similar to those presented below.
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From the three-variable vector-autoregression model, the impulse response of
capital-market risk to a one-standard-deviation exchange-rate shock is plotted in Figure 6-
2.  In the short run (up to 8 months) an exchange-rate shock has a small, negative impact
on the capital-market risk of Thailand.  However, when we consider a one-standard-
deviation band for the impulse response line, we can conclude that the effect of a one-
standard-deviation exchange-rate shock on capital-market risk is uncertain. Figure 6-2
also indicates that a one-standard-deviation interest-rate shock increases capital-market
risk by a small magnitude.
Table 6 shows the variance decomposition of the capital-market risk for Thailand.
An interest-rate shock has a dominating impact on the capital-market risk. Therefore,
capital-market risk in Thailand has increased.  Figure 2 confirms this result.
V.  Policy Implications and Concluding Remarks
This study has investigated the short-run impact of the Asian crisis countries’
policy response (increases in interest rates and exchange-rate flexibility) in the presence of
very thin foreign-exchange markets on their capital-market risk and dynamic capital
mobility.  A summary table, Table 7, indicates that in response to a one-standard-deviation
shock to interest and exchange rates, dynamic capital mobility has decreased in all
countries studied. In addition, capital-market risk has increased in each of the crisis
countries.
In sum, we can conclude that the short-run interest-rate increases and exchange-
rate floatations were not successful in keeping foreign investors’ capital in the crisis
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countries where foreign-exchange markets are very thin even compared with Mexico. This
may have been because recent experience also indicates that a large depreciation may
actually cause capital outflows as it creates the fear that the local currency may soon no
longer be convertible into dollars or Western European money (Global Investing News,
1998).
 According to Table 7, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand experienced increased
capital-market risk and decreased capital mobility.  An implication of this study is that
foreign investors’ behavior -- their (self-fulfilling) expectations and their “herding”8 -- had
a much greater effect on the foreign-exchange market than did the crisis countries’ policy
response of interest-rate increases and exchange-rate flexibility. This is partially
attributable to the thinness of foreign exchange markets.  Consequently, capital outflows
could not be stopped in the short-run, the period under study.
The Asian crisis countries’ policy responses of tight money and increased
exchange-rate flexibility may not be effective in controlling capital outflows if there is a
fundamental disequilibrium in the foreign-exchange market in the crisis countries.9  It is
interesting to note that much of the skepticism and nervousness of foreign investors that
led to massive capital outflows has been attributed to the disclosure of information about
these countries’ economies, business practices, and corporate structures (especially the
weakness of financial sectors).  However, much of this information about structure and
                                               
8  The provision of improved data and information on emerging economies to institutional investors
would, in principle, help encourage sounder and more informed investor behavior and reduce the
likelihood of subsequent large “corrections” from earlier excesses (IMF, 1998d).
9     Of course, other factors may have also interfered with the short-term success of these policies.  These
include the external economic environment and the fact that perhaps borrowing countries did not act
quickly enough.  See Fischer (1998) for more information.
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business practices was available before the crisis broke out and was largely ignored.10
What led to this information suddenly becoming a catalyst for capital flight?
It is hoped that future research on the herding behavior of investors during the
Asian crisis will explain the circumstances under which known information is suddenly
acted upon.11  This will help to clarify how financial crises in emerging economies are
transmitted and allow for regulations to be designed that could more directly counter the
destabilizing herding behavior of financial investors.
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Table 1. Foreign-Exchange Market Activity of Asian Crisis Countries and Mexico
________________________________________________________________________
Country GDP1) Average Daily Relative Size
25
Turnover of
Foreign-Exchange
Market Activity 2)
(in percent)3)
________________________________________________________________________
Indonesia 214.6 1.5 0.69
Malaysia*   97.9 1.1 1.12
S. Korea 442.7 3.5 1.12
Thailand 153.9 3.0 1.9
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Asian Average             909.1                            9.1                                1.00
(Crisis Countries)
_______________________________________________________________________
Mexico 402.7 8.6 2.14
Selected Advanced Economies
______________________________________________________________________
United States  8111.0 350.9  4.33
United Kingdom  1288.4 637.6 49.5
Germany  2102.6   94.3  4.48
Japan  4192.3 148.6  3.54
Switzerland    254.9   81.7 32.1
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--
Selected Advanced Economies Average
15949.2 1313.1  8.23
________________________________________________________________________
Notes and Sources: 1) The GDP data is in billions of nominal US$.  Conversion was made
using IFS line rf.  The GDP data is for 1997 and is from IMF (1998b).
2) This data is in billions of US$.  It is for April 1998 and is from BIS (1998).
3) The relative size is calculated as (average daily turnover/GDP).
Table 2. Chronology of Exchange-Rate Movements of Four Asian Crisis Countries:
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand
________________________________________________________________________
Date
26
1997
 May     14-15 Thai baht hit by a massive speculative attack
 July            2 Bank of Thailand moved to managed floating regime (15-20%)
                  11 Indonesia increased trading band from 15% to 24%
                  14 Malaysian central bank abandon defense of ringgit
 August     14 Indonesia allows floatation of ruphia and recorded 2.655 per US$
 October     6 Indonesia ruphia devalued to 3.848 per US$
 November  6 Bank of Korea intervened in foreign exchange market, won 973/US$
                  17 Bank of Korea abandoned defense of won, won 1000/US$
                  18 Thai baht lost 3.5%, Malaysia ringgit lost 2.8% of its value
                  19 Korea expanded daily band from 2.5% to 10%, recording 1035.5/US$
                  26 Korea won 1122/US$, Malaysia ringgit lost 3.5% of its value, and
Indonesia ruphia 4020/US$.
December   5 Korean won 1290/US$, Malaysia ringgit 3.865/US$, and Indonesia
ruphia 4020/US$.
                  11 Korean won 1719.8/US$, Indonesia ruphia lost 12% of its value,
Thailand baht 47.35/US$, and Malaysia ringgit lost 3.7% of its value
                  26 Korean won 1836/US$, Indonesia ruphia 6300/US$.
1998
January      30 Thailand lifts currency restrictions reunifying the spot market
February    13 Korean won 1621/US$, Indonesia ruphia 7000/US$, Thailand baht
48.01/US$ and Malaysia ringgit 3.735/US$.
                   20 Indonesia rupiah 9200/US$, announced plan for currency board.
                   23 Korean won 1654/US$, Indonesia ruphia 9400/US.
March          6 Indonesia ruphia recorded 12300/US$
                   13 Thailand baht 41.6/US$
                   16 Korean won recorded 1460/US$
                   26      Indonesia ruphia recorded 8600 per US$.
________________________________________________________________________
Sources: IMF (1998d) and www.stern.nyu.edu/~nroubini/asia/AsiaChronology1.htm
Table 3.  Indonesia: Variance Decomposition
A. Dynamic Capital Mobility
27
________________________________________________________________________
Step Interest Rate (Int) Exchange Rate (Ex) DUIP
________________________________________________________________________
1 6.42 93.24 0.33
4 5.82 91.70 2.47
8 55.73 43.65 0.60
12 47.05 52.34 0.60
16 58.94 40.74 0.28
20 56.86 42.53 0.59
24 60.47 38.95 0.56
________________________________________________________________________
Note: Block causality test.  Dependent variable appears first and Prob denotes significance probability of F
statistic.
1) Interest rate: Int, Prob[(F=5.15)]=.00;  Ex, Prob[( F= 2.33)]=.04;  Duip, Prob[( F=1.91)]=.08
2) Exchange rate: Int, Prob[(F=30.06)]=.00;  Ex, Prob[( F= 7.09)]=.00;  Duip, Prob[( F=6.57)]=.00
3) DUIP:  Int, Prob[(F=31.49)]=.00;  Ex, Prob[( F= 7.01)]=.00;  Duip, Prob[( F=7.12)]=.00
B. Capital-Market Risk
________________________________________________________________________
  Step   Interest Rate (Int) Exchange rate (Ex) Variance (Var)
________________________________________________________________________
1 0.003 38.13 61.86
4 3.756 96.08 0.15
8 5.527 94.36 0.11
12 7.929 92.04 0.02
16 7.933 92.04 0.02
20 7.998 91.98 0.02
24 7.998 91.98 0.02
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
Note: Block causality test.  Dependent variable appears first and Prob denotes significance probability of F
statistic.
1) Interest rate: Int, Prob[(F=21.6)]=.00;  Ex, Prob[( F= 2.52)]=.04;  Var, Prob[( F=1.65)]=.16
2) Exchange rate:  Int, Prob[(F=48.7)]=.00;  Ex, Prob[( F= 51.5)]=.00;  Var, Prob[( F=19.2)]=.00
3) VAR:  Int, Prob[(F=31.49)]=.00;  Ex, Prob[( F= 7.01)]=.00;  Var, Prob[( F=7.12)]=.00
Table 4.  Korea: Variance Decomposition
A. Dynamic Capital Mobility
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________________________________________________________________________
Step Interest Rate (Int) Exchange Rate (Ex) DUIP
________________________________________________________________________
1 0.81 81.10 18.08
4 0.26 72.03 27.70
8 1.46 70.88 27.65
12 2.62 69.99 27.37
16 2.71 69.65 27.62
20 2.72 69.56 27.72
24 2.74 69.53 27.72
________________________________________________________________________
Note: Block causality test.  Dependent variable appears first and Prob denotes significance probability of F
statistic.
1) Exchange rate: Int, Prob[(F=79.3)]=.00;  Ex, Prob[( F= 0.32)]=.81;  Duip, Prob[( F=2.53)]=.06
2) Interest rate: Int, Prob[(F=29.6)]=.00;  Ex, Prob[( F= 1.27)]=.29;  Duip, Prob[( F=4.75)]=.00
3) DUIP:  Int, Prob[(F=0.54)]=.65;  Ex, Prob[( F= 0.97)]=.41;  Duip, Prob[( F=35.9)]=.00
B. Capital-Market Risk
________________________________________________________________________
Step Interest Rate (Int) Exchange rate (Ex) Variance (Var)
________________________________________________________________________
1 0.18 14.32 85.49
4 17.08 63.53 19.37
8 18.84 24.31 56.83
12 25.25 63.63 11.11
16 28.03 51.12 20.84
20 29.27 40.52 30.21
24 29.03 55.11 15.85
________________________________________________________________________
Note: Block causality test.  Dependent variable appears first and Prob denotes significance probability of F
statistic.
1) Interest rate: Int, Prob[(F=15.8)]=.00;  Ex, Prob[( F= 2.99)]=.00;  Var, Prob[( F=1.33)]=.25
2) Exchange rate: Int, Prob[(F=1.07)]=.39;  Ex, Prob[( F= 42.9)]=.00;  Var, Prob[( F=2.99)]=.00
3) VAR:  Int, Prob[(F=1.59)]=.15;  Ex, Prob[( F= 30.46)]=.00;  Var, Prob[( F=8.71)]=.00
Table 5.  Malaysia: Variance Decomposition
A. Dynamic Capital Mobility
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________________________________________________________________________
Step Interest Rate (Int) Exchange Rate (Ex) DUIP
________________________________________________________________________
1 0.83 47.44 51.72
4 49.23 15.38 35.38
8 62.72 12.36 24.92
12 67.02 14.17 18.81
16 53.35 31.33 15.31
20 43.05 41.15 15.79
24 40.78 43.93 15.28
________________________________________________________________________
Note: Block causality test.  Dependent variable appears first and Prob denotes significance probability of F
statistic.
1) Exchange rate: Int, Prob[(F=4.54)]=.00;  Ex, Prob[( F= 71.03)]=.00;  Duip, Prob[( F=1.19)]=.31
2) Interest rate: Int, Prob[(F=48.7)]=.00;  Ex, Prob[( F=1.06)]=.41;  Duip, Prob[( F=1.59)]=.15
3) DUIP:  Int, Prob[(F=16.8)]=.00;  Ex, Prob[( F= 1.51)]=.17;  Duip, Prob[( F=52.06)]=.00
B. Capital-Market Risk
________________________________________________________________________
Step Interest Rate (Int) Exchange Rate (Ex) Variance (Var)
________________________________________________________________________
1 1.66 4.67 93.66
4 21.76 28.91 49.32
8 22.68 34.25 43.06
12 28.90 27.40 43.68
16 28.63 26.29 45.12
20 33.76 22.40 43.82
24 36.64 19.54 43.81
________________________________________________________________________
Note: Block causality test.  Dependent variable appears first and Prob denotes significance probability of F
statistic.
1) Interest rate: Int, Prob[(F=239.4)]=.00;  Ex, Prob[( F= 1.16)]=.33;  Var, Prob[( F=0.93)]=.48
2) Exchange rate: Int, Prob[(F=2.72)]=.01;  Ex, Prob[( F= 62.0)]=.00;  Var, Prob[( F=3.20)]=.00
3) VAR:  Int, Prob[(F=8.03)]=.00;  Ex, Prob[( F= 4.62)]=.00;  Var, Prob[( F=8.07)]=.00
Table 6: Thailand: Variance Decomposition
A. Dynamic Capital Mobility
________________________________________________________________________
30
Step Interest Rate (Int) Exchange Rate (Ex) DUIP
________________________________________________________________________
1 1.18 66.68 32.12
4 11.10 52.85 36.04
8 16.93 61.06 22.00
12 11.35 65.81 22.83
16 4.08 75.32 20.58
20 3.46 81.04 15.49
24 5.17 80.20 14.62
________________________________________________________________________
Note: Block causality test.  Dependent variable appears first and Prob denotes significance probability of F
statistic.
1) Exchange rate: Int, Prob[(F=4.15)]=.00;  Ex, Prob[( F= 74.04)]=.00;  Duip, Prob[( F=3.97)]=.00
2) Interest rate: Int, Prob[(F=22.6)]=.00;  Ex, Prob[( F=.39)]=.85;  Duip, Prob[( F=0.55)]=.73
3) DUIP:  Int, Prob[(F=3.01)]=.01;  Ex, Prob[( F= 3.24)]=.01;  Duip, Prob[( F=61.5)]=.00
B. Capital-Market Risk
________________________________________________________________________
Step Interest Rate (Int) Exchange Rate (Ex) Variance (Var)
________________________________________________________________________
1 9.51 0 90.48
4 40.48 1.60 57.91
8 56.32 2.43 41.24
12 63.43 1.85 34.72
16 68.29 1.38 30.32
20 71.51 1.05 27.43
24 73.83 0.81 25.35
________________________________________________________________________
Note: Block causality test.  Dependent variable appears first and Prob denotes significance probability of F
statistic.
1) Interest rate: Int, Prob[(F=17.34)]=.00;  Ex, Prob[( F= 0.36)]=.82;  Var, Prob[( F=0.66)]=.61
2) Exchange rate: Int, Prob[(F=3.61)]=.00;  Ex, Prob[( F=97.0)]=.00;  Var, Prob[( F=3.20)]=.00
3) VAR:  Int, Prob[(F=8.03)]=.00;  Ex, Prob[( F= 4.62)]=.00;  Var, Prob[( F=2.08)]=.00
Table 7.  Impact of Interest- and Exchange-Rate Shocks on Capital Market
___________________________________________________
Country Capital-Market
Risk
Capital Mobility
31
___________________________________________________
Indonesia       + 1)    - 2)
Thailand       +    -
Malaysia       +    -
Korea       +    -
___________________________________________________
   Note: 1) Increased, 2) Decreased
                     Figure 1.  Dynamic Capital Mobility of Indonesia and Korea
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Capital Mobility of Korea
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            Figure 1. Dynamic Capital Mobility of Malaysia and Thailand (continued)
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Capital Mobility of Malaysia
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Capital Mobility of Thailand
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                       Figure 2. Capital-Market Risk of Indonesia and Korea
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Capital market Risk of Korea
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           Figure 2. Capital-Market Risk of Malaysia and Thailand (continued)
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Figure 3-1. Indonesia: Impulse Response Function of Capital Mobility
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           Figure 3-2. Indonesia: Impulse Response Function of Capital-Market Risk
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            Figure 4-1. Korea: Impulse Response Function of Capital Mobility
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         Figure 4-2. Korea: Impulse Response Function of Capital-Market Risk
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           Figure 5-1. Malaysia: Impulse Response Function of Capital Mobility
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        Figure 5-2. Malaysia: Impulse Response Function of Capital-Market Risk
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        Figure 6-1. Thailand: Impulse Response Function of Capital Mobility
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       Figure 6-2. Thailand: Impulse Response Function of Capital-Market Risk
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